In this paper, we investigate a simple but effective coding mechanism, namely Coding Opportunistically (COPE) 
INTRODUCTION
In order to optimize the network performance, particularly reducing the bandwidth consumption in a wireless network, there exist several techniques, such as network load balancing [2] , routing optimization [2] [3] [5] . Another approach is the network coding paradigm that aims at increasing the performance in the network. In network coding, intermediate nodes, in a transmission network, can combine multiple native packets from different sources using simple operations, such as the Exclusive-OR operator, into a coded packet and then broadcast the coded packet in a single transmission instead of simply forwarding each native packet one by one. Therefore, the number of transmissions is reduced, and the network capacity is increased.
One of the first practical network coding techniques proposed as an effective forwarding architecture for wireless networks is the Coding Opportunistically (COPE) model [1] . COPE uses a two-hop coding pattern in order to identify the packets that can be coded together. Even though COPE is simple and effective, there still exist some short comings that lead to security and privacy issues. COPE nodes can overhear packets from their neighbours. That is, each node can read any content of packets transmitted in its radio range. Moreover, the intermediate nodes which is in charge of coding the packets are mostly likely to misuse the retrieved information for the malicious purposes. As an example, see the sample network represented in Figure 2 . We can see that N 1 can listen to and get packets which N 2 and N 4 send to N 5 . If N 1 is a malicious node, it can replay data from N 2 and N 4 for the other transactions, or modify the data. Therefore, there is a need for protecting packets against transmitting nodes that are able to listen to transmissions from their neighbours, both in terms of confidentiality as well as of integrity. In addition to this, COPE relies on opportunistic listening by which transmitting nodes can be aware of the packet queue lists of their neighbours to increase the chances of finding packets that can be coded. This introduces more privacy issues when considering intruders or malicious transmission nodes.
In order to address the privacy issues related to COPE, we propose in this paper a secure COPE (i.e., SCOPE) protocol that exploits cryptographic techniques to address the privacy issues related to the plain COPE. More precisely, and not to affect the desired goal of increasing the network capacity aimed from COPE, we adopt the additive homomorphic Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [12] that, in addition to providing the needed security requirements, is also lightweight and fits our considered scenarios for secure and still good performing network coding using COPE. Our experimental results demonstrate that the performance cost of SCOPE is negligible.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we review the related literature and position our suggested work. In Section 3 we provide background information on the required concepts related to both COPE and to ECC encryption. In Section 4 we formalize our security model, and in Sections 5 and 6 we present the SCOPE architecture and protocol, respectively. In Section 7 we provide the experimental evaluation of SCOPE. The security property will be expressed in Section 8. We finally conclude the paper in Section 9.
RELATED WORKS
Today, coding opportunity is one of the hot topics in network coding technique. As such, after COPE, several other interesting research works focused on designing network coding conditions that can increase the coding opportunities, hence better improve the network capacity. For instance, we find BEND [6] (BEND is not an acronym) with non-intersecting two-hop flows and DCAR (Distributed Coding-Aware Routing in Wireless Networks) [7] with intersecting more than two-hop flows. DODE (Distributed Opportunistic and Diffused Coding in Multihop Wireless Networks) [8] has combined the advantages of COPE, BEND and DCAR to still increase the coding chances. DODEX (Distributed and Diffused Encoding with Multiple Decoders) [9] with multiple encoder has been developed from DODE. On the other hand, Re-encoding of a coded packet is agreed in DODEX+ (Distributed and Diffused Encoding with Multiple Encoders and Multiple Decoders) [13] to detect more codable flows. Besides that, some applications of linear programming to optimize the throughput of COPE [5] and BEND [3] to create more opportunities for coding and provide a better total network throughput. These issues have been addressed by considering the best paths which not only have more coding chances but also avoid wireless interference among network nodes in the network.
With the richness of the literature in terms of network coding schemes that aim at improving the coding opportunity rate, COPE, as well as most of its improved successors, suffer from privacy and security related issues.One of the first works providing an analysis to secure network coding is in [14] . In this work, an eavesdropper able to see information in a single source scenario has been considered. Subsequently, in order to allow for secure network coding different models have been proposed [15] . The early works started by proposing a wiretap model, where the main idea consists at collecting subsets of nodes in a network coding system in wiretap networks such that each wiretapper has access to only one of these subsets [16] .After that, the focus has shifted to addressing network coding security and privacy issues using different cryptographic schemes. The challenge, however, is to ensure the security and privacy of a network coding protocol (such as COPE), without much sacrificing the initial goal of increasing network capacity. It is indeed well known that cryptographic schemes do mostly come with huge costs both in terms of size and processing time.
Of the works available, we find the model proposed in [17] , where the authors focus on the privacy preservation issue in terms of preventing traffic analysis and tracing in multi-hope wireless networks. The authors deploy the Paillier [22] homomorphic encryption scheme, which is based in the usage of large primes. The related consequence is on performance as operations done on large prime numbers is quite costly.
In [18] , the authors have focused on the shortcomings of the Homomorphic Message Authentication Code (H-MAC) in terms of its vulnerability to pollution attacks, and in the context of being used to secure communications in transmission networks. The authors have proposed an improvement to minimize both data pollution and tag pollution attacks related to H-MAC, by introducing two types of tags, one related to verifying the integrity of the packet and the other related to checking the integrity of the H-MAC itself. In their analysis, they have showed that their method not only decreases the probability of tag pollution but it also results in decreasing the related bandwidth overhead. However, the overhead remains considerable. Many other works, such as [20] [21] , have also studied the usage of H-MAC based techniques to secure network coding; however, the overhead remains quite high and the problem of data and tag pollutions often remain an issue. Moreover, we can also find the work in [19] where the authors have identified a flaw in H-MAC in general and have provided a corresponding inaccuracy in its formal security proof. This keeps it to doubt whether H-MAC based solutions are worthwhile in practice or not.
Differently from the available works in cryptographic secure network coding schemes, we proposed in this paper applying the lightweight ECC scheme to address the security and privacy issues in COPE.
BACKGROUND
COPE is a forwarding architecture for wireless mesh network. It is quite simple and effective in reducing the quantity of transmissions. Whereas, encryption algorithms are strong enough to secure data as well as to preserve the privacy against the curious attackers. We introduce herewith COPE and additive homomorphic encryption in the sense of highlighting their combination strength in tackling the security requirements mentioned in Sections 1 and 4.2.
COPE -Coding Opportunistically
Let us briefly describe COPE protocol. COPE has been the first practical network coding mechanism applied in wireless networks, aiming at reducing a significant quantity of transmissions. Thus the wireless throughput consumption can be optimized by coding several packets into one are forwarding them through a single transmission. But they locate out of the radio ranges of each other. Consequently, they cannot directly communicate. However, both of them can send their packets through node N which places in the both of radio ranges. The relaying packets between N 1 and N with COPE. Let P 1 , P 3 be packets sent, respectively, from are four unicast transmissions (i.e., P protocol. In case of COPE protocol (see Figure 1 strings of bits, and aggregated by N a coded packet P=P 1 +P 3 . Hence, N result, the number of transmissions drops down to three, including two unicast transmissions P 1 : N 1 N 3 , P 3 :N 3 N 1 ) and 1 broadcast transmission Example 1. .Let us give an example by considering Figure 2 . A link connecting two nodes, depicted as a dash line, indicates that they are in radio ranges of each other, therefore they called neighbours. Initially, nodes N nodes N 6 , N 4 , N 1 and N 2 , via node N P 3 , P 4 , respectively, from N 1 , N 2 P 2 + P 3 + P 4 and broadcasts P to N N 4 can decode to obtain its expected packet. They can do this, since each of nodes can catch the packets from its neighbours by overhearing their signals in the air. For example, N P 2 and P 4 from N 2 and N 4 . By XOR packets P 2 and P 4 , N 3 obtains P 1 via N 3 . N 3 receives P 6 , then, creates the aggregation P' = P neighbours, that is, N 5 and N 6 P 1 =P'+P 6 . Similarly, N 5 decodes and retrie Figure 1 . Two nodes N 1 and N 3 want to make a packet transfer to each other. But they locate out of the radio ranges of each other. Consequently, they cannot directly communicate. However, both of them can send their packets through node N which places in the both of radio ranges. Then, N 2 becomes an intermediate node in charge of and N 3 . Let us see Figure 1a which describes a protocol not applied be packets sent, respectively, from N 1 to N 3 and vice versa. Hence, there transmissions (i.e., P 1 :N 1 N 2 , P 3 :N 3 N 2 , P 3 :N 2 N 1 , P 1 :N 2 se of COPE protocol (see Figure 1b) , the packets from N 1 and N 3 are considered as strings of bits, and aggregated by N 2 , using the operator Exclusive--OR denoted as '+', to produce . Hence, N 2 is called encoder, whereas N 1 and N 3 are decoder result, the number of transmissions drops down to three, including two unicast transmissions and 1 broadcast transmission (i.e., P:N 2 {N 1 , N 3 }).
Let us give an example by considering Figure 2 . A link connecting two nodes, depicted as a dash line, indicates that they are in radio ranges of each other, therefore they called neighbours. Initially, nodes N 1 , N 2 ,N 3 and N 4 send packets P 1 , P 2 ,P 3 and P 4 , respectively, to , via node N 5 . N 5 has to wait to adequately get four native packets P 2 , N 3 and N 4 . N 5 then aggregates them to a coded packet P = P and broadcasts P to N 1 , N 2 , N 3 and N 4 in a single transmission. Nodes N can decode to obtain its expected packet. They can do this, since each of nodes can catch the its neighbours by overhearing their signals in the air. For example, N 3 . By XOR-ing P with its generated-and-sent packet P 3 and the overheard 1 = P + P 2 + P 3 + P 4 . Similarly, N 6 wants to send packet P , then, creates the aggregation P' = P 1 +P 6 , then broadcasts P' to its 6 . N 6 receives and decodes P' to retrieve its expected packet decodes and retrieves its expected original packet P 6 .
hop flows (i.e., including three nodes connected and involved in a transaction) are considered. Let consider 2-hop want to make a packet transfer to each other. But they locate out of the radio ranges of each other. Consequently, they cannot directly communicate. However, both of them can send their packets through node N 2 becomes an intermediate node in charge of a which describes a protocol not applied and vice versa. Hence, there N 3 ) in this are considered as OR denoted as '+', to produce decoders. As a result, the number of transmissions drops down to three, including two unicast transmissions (i.e., Let us give an example by considering Figure 2 . A link connecting two nodes, depicted as a dash line, indicates that they are in radio ranges of each other, therefore they are so-, respectively, to has to wait to adequately get four native packets P 1 , P 2 , then aggregates them to a coded packet P = P 1 + in a single transmission. Nodes N 1 , N 2 , N 3 and can decode to obtain its expected packet. They can do this, since each of nodes can catch the 3 can overhear and the overheard wants to send packet P 6 to N 5 , then broadcasts P' to its receives and decodes P' to retrieve its expected packet
COPE header.
A COPE header is inserted into the header of a packet, placed between the MAC and IP headers. The COPE header has a structure, as follows. A COPE header includes three blocks, that is, coding report, reception report, and ACK report. Coding report contains information of the XOR-ed native packets and their next hop. Reception report contains information of overlearned packets from neighbours including the source, the received last packet from that source, and a bitmap presenting the list of recently received packets from that source. ACK report contains the information of received or missed packets which the sending node has, including a neighbour IP, the last ACKed packet from that neighbour and a bit map of ACKed packet. 
Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption which allows specific types of computations to be carried out on ciphertexts and generate an encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches the result of operations performed on the plaintexts. Homomorphic encryption has three kinds, that is, additive homomorphic encryption, multiplicative encryption, and full homomorphic encryption having both of additive and multiplicative encryptions.
In this paper, the additive homomorphic encryption in [11] is considered as a brilliant candidate for solving the mentioned privacy issues of data coding as it can secure the coded data, as well as, preserve the result of executing the Exclusive-OR bit-wise operator. The property of the Exclusive-OR operator is "A+A=0".Let P 1 and P 2 be two considered messages, k be public key, P be the coded data of P 1 and P 2 , C be the cipher text of P encrypted with k, Dec k (C) or P be the plain text ofC decrypted with k. Let us consider P 1 , P 2 and P be three strings of bits. Encryption and decryption of the two messages as follows:
In our paper, we adopt Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [12] based on the binary finite field F 2 m . Assume each node n i in the network has a pair of keys (k i , k i .B) where B is a base parameter of ECC and public to all over the network, k i is the private key, and k i .B is the public key. With ECC, the encryption of a message P 1 with k i is C 1 =Enc ki (P)=(r i .B, P i +r i .B.k i ), and the decryption with k i is P i =Dec ki (C i )=P i +r i .B.k i -(r i .B).k i, where r i is a random number generated by the encryptor.
Hence, the addition of two encryption gets C = Enc ki (P 1 )+Enc ki (P 2 )=(r 1 
SECURITY MODEL AND REQUIREMENT

Security Model
Although COPE is simple but effective in reducing the amount of transmissions, COPE still discloses the risks of being attacked. Particularly, COPE header, as presented in Section 3.1.3.,containsmuch sensitive information relating to identity of recipient and sender of the considered packet. In this paper, we consider the honest-but-curious attackers.
Honest-but-curious attack. They correctly operate the protocol without modifying data. However, they try to learn as much personal information of the other users as possible to satisfy their curiosity. They do not use the learned data for any harmful purpose. These adversaries do not cause serious consequences, but their act can leave a back door for the other attacks if they do not preserve well that data. In this work, each node may be considered as an honest-but-curious attacker. They can learn the private information from the COPE header as well as infer the path on which the packet moves through. If they are intersecting nodes, they can try on the received packets. In case they are surrounding nodes of the packet's path, they can try to overhear the packets from that path.
Example 2.The adversary can get the aggregate package, e.g., P=P 1 +P 2 +P 3 , at the same time itreceives another aggregate packet, i.e., P'=P 1 +P 2 ,so it can infer the content of the packet P 3 = P -P'.
Security Requirement
Based on the risk analysis from the above attack models, to avoid serious consequences of attacks, some security requirements need to be guaranteed to be done on the aggregate packet moving through the network.
(1) Packet data security. The packet payload cannot be read by the intermediate nodes on the network path. It should be accessed by only its destination. To ensure this requirement, a solution should adopt cryptographic algorithms into the problem. The COPE packets should be encrypted with the public key of the destination node, and are aggregated in a secret way. There are two parts to be encrypted, that is, packet payload and fields in the COPE header for coding condition evaluation. This will be presented in further details in Section 6.
(2) Secure coding condition evaluation. The intermediate nodes only code the packets they receive if the packets satisfy the coding conditions of theirs. However, the coding condition evaluation process also leaks the packet flow information. To avoid the other party can see the evaluation process at the intermediate node, the security solution is needed. In this work, the cryptographic solutions are proposed to secure this coding condition evaluation process. This will be expressed in more details in Section 6.
(3) Performance optimization. As the network model is peer-to-peer, the peer devices own plenty of restrictions, that is, limited physical resource and performance. Hence there is a need of requirement, that is, to select a lightweight cryptographic algorithm to secure packets and make the protocol of encrypting packets more securely. In this work, the lightweight cryptography algorithm, i.e., ECC is adopted to reduce the performance cost, at the same time keep the security complexity of an encryption algorithm. The details will be expressed in Section 6.
SCOPE ARCHITECTURE
This section describes a secure COPE architecture, namely SCOPE.SCOPE has three sides, that is, the source, the destination and the intermediate nodes. As in Figure 4 , the source is N i in charge of sending a packet to a certain destination. Whereas, the destination is N j receiving the packet sent from N i . Moreover, the middle side is N m , as considered as an intermediate node, which takes packets and checks the conditions of SCOPE to see if it can aggregate the received packets by using the operator Exclude-OR (see Section6for the aggregate SCOPE conditions), then propagate the aggregate to the next node. For example, as in Figure 4 -a, it is assumed that N i sends a packet P ij to N j through N m , and N j sends a packet P ji to N i through N m . N m invokes an Exclusive-ORoperator (denoted as "+") over the two received packets, and obtains an aggregate value, that is, P m = P ij + P ji . In order to make N m able to successfully compute P m but also keep the aggregate value in a secret without learning any information from the packets. To achieve this goal, the additive homomorphic encryption is investigated to be used. Let us consider the scenario when the additive homomorphic encryption is applied into data coding mechanism as follows:
a -COPE: Data coding without encryption b -SCOPE:Encrypting coding data.
• At source node N i :Let us consider Figure 4 -b, node N i tends to send data P ij to N j through N m .
Before it transmits P ij to N m , it encrypts P ij by N j 's public key k j and obtains an encryption Enc Kj (P ij ). It propagates this encryption to N m . In the meantime, N j also wants to send data P ji to N i through N m . N j encrypts P ji by N i 's public key k i and obtains an encryption Enc ki (P ji ). Then N j send this encryption to N m as well.
• At intermediate node N m : N m aggregates the two received encryption from N i and N j by performing the operator Exclusive-OR on the two cipher text, to receiveC = Enc kj (P ij ) + Enc ki (P ji )=Enc (ki,kj) (P ji + P ij ) where C is the encryption of the coded data of P ij and P ji . Then, N m transfers C to both N i and N j .
• At destination node N j : N j again adds its Enc kj (P ij ) to C and obtains Enc kj (P ij ) + (Enc kj (P ij ) + Enc ki (P ji ))=Enc ki (P ji ). N j then decrypts Enc ki (P ji ) with its private key to achieve the data from N i to it, that is, P ji . The same steps are similarly performed at N i .
SCOPE SECRET PROTOCOL
Secure Coding Condition
Let us see Figure 4 -b,node N i sends a packet P ij to its target, that is, N j , through N m . To make P ij able to reach N j , the work at N m is crucial as it decides to forward the packet to N j . Forwarding the packet is not simply receiving and sending the received packet P ij to the network. It does not also mean that packets move through the intermediate nodes to reach their destination, not all of intermediates will code (i.e., aggregate) the by-passed packets and propagate the result packets towards. As the objectives of coding protocol, to reduce the bandwidth cost, N m needs to aggregate (i.e., code) several packets together and forwards only the aggregate packet. In order to support N m in deciding the P ij propagation, the coding conditions are built up for N m to be evaluated. The necessary parameters for the coding condition evaluation are retrieved from the header of COPE packet. Only the packets satisfying the coding conditions will be aggregated into their suitable packet then sent towards to their destination. The above conditions are readable and stored in the header of each node. However, the coding condition evaluation process is done by the intersecting node (i.e., the intermediate node) N m . Node N m also needs the information from its surrounding nodes, especially the nodes are the sender and the recipients of the packets through it, as in Figure 4 -b, that is, N i and N j . Hence, in case that N m is not an honest and benign node, this assessment process can leak the packet flow information to the intermediate, and cause a serious consequence to the data security and privacy as presented in Section 4.2. This process thus should be done in a secure way. In this work, we adopt the homomorphic encryption as an effective way to secure this process, particularly, ECC is used for securing data. More specifically, all information owned by N m are encrypted with a public key K m . All data at N i and N j are respectively encrypted with the public keys of N i and N j , that is, K i and K j . It is noted that the atomic data which is encrypted is the ID of node's neighbours or previous hops or next hops. The encrypted atomic data is specified as in Definition 2. The coding condition evaluation is processed at the intersecting node but it needs a collaboration among multiple parties (i.e., the intersecting node, and its previous hop and next hop on the same flow) to support this evaluation process. For example, as in Figure 4 -b, the coding condition evaluation is done by N m but it needs a collaboration among N i , N m and N j . However, as presented in Section 4.2., to prevent the risk of information violation, this collaboration needs to be processed secretly to avoid leaking anode's private information to the others. In this situation, the information of N i and N j must be kept against the reading of N m . Moreover, the nature of each coding condition evaluation is a comparison among elements of the two lists. Hence, to meet the security requirement in Section 4. • If the two lists are totally equal, the conditions is met.
More specifically, in the Algorithm 1, N m traverses the two lists and (lines 2,3) to evaluate the equality of elements of two lists by subtracting (or Exclusive-ORing)each element of by each element of (line 4).Let count be a temporary integer. If the subtractive result is equal to an encryption of 0 generated with the public key of N i and N j , i.e., K i and K j , that means is equal to , count is increased by 1 (line 5). Then, if count is equal to the sizes of two lists, that is, sizeNH and sizePH (lines 9, 10, 11), the functions return true (line 12), it means two lists are equal, otherwise false is returned (line 14). In case the two lists are equal, it also indicates that the coding condition is met. Then, the other coding condition can be continued to be evaluated.
Secure Payload Coding
The fact that COPE header are protected against attacks of observing the flow of packet and intervening the packets' routines is protecting coding conditions and operations on them as presented in Section 6.1.Even though that is a meaningful and important security strategy, securing data payload also play a substantial role since the payload contains several sensitive information of users. Especially, the coding is done at the intersecting node. As discussed in Section 4.2., the intersecting node can be an adversary and the plain data can reveal the personal information to the intersecting node. Hence, the payload should be secured. In this work, ECC algorithm is used to encrypt data into the cipher. This solution makes the intersecting node unable to read the data but at the same time still work on the encryption only. Hence, the sending node needs to encrypt the data before propagating the encryption to the intersecting node. where r 0 , r 1 , …, r n are random numbers generated at nodes creating the partial encryptions.
Example 8. Let us continue Example 7. It is assumed that N i wants to send the packet P ij to N j through N m on flow F 1 , so it encrypts the payload of P ij into Enc Kj (P ij ) and forwards this encryption to N m . In the meanwhile, N j wants to send the packet P ji to N i through N m on flow F 2 , so it encrypts the payload of P ji into Enc Ki (P ji ) and forwards this encryption to N m . At node N m , after evaluating the coding condition as in Example 4, N m code the two encryptions Enc Kj (P ij ) and Enc Ki (P ji ) by aggregating them, and get Enc (Ki,Kj) (P ij +P ji )=(r i .B+r j .B,(P ij +P ji )+(r 1 .B.K 1 +r 2 .B.K 2 )) as the coded payload cipher.
Receiving packets from different neighbour nodes, after evaluating the coding condition, N m detaches the encrypted payloads of all packets and code them. Then N m put them into a new packet. Then, N m propagates it towards the network. As the receiving node gets the coded packet from N m , it can assess the coded payload cipher, then decodes and decrypts the cipher to obtain the data for it. This process is concerned as the coded payload assessment. The decoded payload is defined as in Definition 6. Example 9. Let us continue Example 8. Enc (Ki,Kj) (P ij + P ji ) = (r i .B + r j .B, (P cipher of the packet it wants to send to Ni, that is, Enc random number generated by N j . Enc Ki (P ji ) = (r i .B + r j .B, (P ij + P ji ((P ij + P ji + (r i .B.K i + r j .B.K j + P ji at N j with the private key of N j (r j .B).K j + P ij + r j .B.K j = P ij .
SCOPE EVALUATION
In this work, to prove for effectiveness and efficiency of the experiments on different number of nodes and different key sizes of ECC encryption are done. These experiments are operated on PC with the physical resources in terms of CPU Duo-Core, RAM 4GB, HDD 16GB.
Throughput
We use NS-2 as a simulator for the experiment Figure 6b , and Figure 6c . Flows in t been generated in a flat area 1000m X 1000m (Constant Bit Rate) flows sent over UDP (User Datagram Protocol) using with an arrival interval of 0.01s protocol used is DSDV (Destination with a confident interval of 95%. Results are presented in Figure  simulation coding gains are 1.050 and = 1.600 is 1.020 for the simulation while the coding gain is test scenario of Figure 6c , the simulated coding gain and the theor and = 1.067, respectively. These account the collision in wireless network environment. The collision can lead to the delay increase that a packet sent from source node to destination node and so, some coding Let us continue Example 8. N j receives the coded payload cipher for it, that is, .B, (P ij + P ji ) + (r i .B.K i + r j .B.K j )). N j still keeps the coded payload cipher of the packet it wants to send to Ni, that is, Enc Ki (P ji ) = (r i .B, P ji + r i .B.K i ) where r . Hence, the decoded payload is Enc Kj (P ij ) = Enc (Ki,Kj) ji ) + (r i .B.K i + r j .B.K j )) + (r i .B, P ji + r i .B.K i ) = ((r i .B + r + r i .B.K i )) = (r j .B, P ij + r j .B.K j ). Then, the decryption is executed (i.e., K j ), to get the data needed for N j , i.e., Dec Kj
In this work, to prove for effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed secure protocol experiments on different number of nodes and different key sizes of ECC encryption are done. These experiments are operated on PC with the physical resources in terms of CPU , RAM 4GB, HDD 16GB.
2 as a simulator for the experiment. We use 4 topologies in Figure  Flows in test scenarios are shown in the Table 2 . Each topology has 1000m X 1000m. The data traffic in the network are all CBR (Constant Bit Rate) flows sent over UDP (User Datagram Protocol) using 1000-byte datagra 0.01s and traffic generation duration at source of 150s. The routing (Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector) [10] . The results are collected .
Comparison between analytical coding gain and simulation coding gain.
Results are presented in Figure 5 , which compares between the coding gains obtained by simulation and the ones obtained by theoretical analysis [5] . We observe that the coding gains obtained by theoretical analysis are always greater than what obtained by simulation. For case of Figure 1 , the simulated coding gain is equal to 1.033 = 1.333. For the test scenario of Figure 6a , the simulated and analytical = 1.600, respectively. For the test case of Figure 6b , the coding gain for the simulation while the coding gain is = 1.333 for the theoretical analysis. For the , the simulated coding gain and the theoretical coding gain equal , respectively. These deviations are because the theoretical analysis cannot take into account the collision in wireless network environment. The collision can lead to the delay increase that a packet sent from source node to destination node and so, some coding which compares between the coding gains obtained by . We observe that the coding gains obtained by theoretical analysis are always greater than what obtained by simulation. For 1.033 while the , the simulated and analytical , the coding gain for the theoretical analysis. For the etical coding gain equal 1.060 deviations are because the theoretical analysis cannot take into account the collision in wireless network environment. The collision can lead to the delay increase that a packet sent from source node to destination node and so, some coding opportunities are missed. Besides that, frame loss, frame retransmission, or framing error are also one of the problems derived from the collision, affecting to
Time overhead
In this experiment, to assess the computing performance of SCOPE. experimentson different parameters. 1, 6a, 6b, 6c), and change the key sizes of ECC additive homomorphic encryption algorithm. Each calculated value in the experiment Scenario re missed. Besides that, frame loss, frame retransmission, or framing error are also one of the problems derived from the collision, affecting to the coding gain results. experiment, to assess the computing performance of SCOPE. We make a diversity of different parameters. Particularly, we create fourSCOPE scenarios (as in Figures , and change the key sizes of ECC additive homomorphic encryption algorithm.
experimentsis the average of 20 times running the same Figure 6 .SCOPE scenarios. First, the time on aggregating the payload ciphers in the four scenarios. These payload ciphers are aggregated using the additive property of ECC homomorphic encryption. The number of payload cipher aggregation at the intersecting node in the four scenarios are respectively 2, 4, 6, 8 for each flow. In Figure 7 , with the smallest ECC key size (i.e., 163 bits), the time on aggregating two payload ciphers of Scenario 1 is 26,8ms. With the 283-bit key size, the time on aggregating 8 payload ciphers of Scenario 4 is 107,2ms. In the worst case, that is, the largest key size (i.e., 571 bit), the time computed for aggregating 8 payload ciphers of Scenario 4 is 268,8ms. The times on different scenarios and key sizes are reasonable in the peer-to-peer environment. Figure 8 is another experiment to compute the time cost for SCOPE transmissions. These time are measured to evaluate the time which a packet moves through a flow from the source node to the destination node. Hence, these times include the payload cipher aggregating times (as in the experiment of Figure 7 ) and transmission times. In this experiment, the number of payload cipher aggregations at the intersecting nodes are similar to the previous experiment. The ECC key sizes are also varied in {163, 283, 409, 571} bits. In the case of smallest ECC key size, that is, 163 bits, in scenario 1 involving 2 payload cipher aggregations, the time cost is 260,8ms. Whereas, in the case of largest ECC key size (i.e., 571 bits) and Scenario 4 involving 8 payload cipher aggregations, the time costs is 2.5s. The time overheads in this experiment in both cases are reasonable and prove that SCOPE is effective and efficient. In order to evaluate the cryptographic process of evaluating the coding conditions of SCOPE, we measure the time SCOPE spent on this evaluation ( Figure 9 ). The key sizes are selected in the range {163, 283, 409, 571} bits. The number of coding conditions for Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 are respectively 4, 20, 30, 32 conditions. The time on evaluating the coding conditions in Scenario 1 (i.e., with the lowest number of conditions, that is, 4) with the smallest key size (i.e., 163 bits) is 6.8ms. In the meanwhile, the time on coding conditions evaluation in Scenario 4 (i.e., the highest number of condition, that is, 32) with the largest ECC key size (i.e., 571 bits) is 115,2 ms. In the both cases of the smallest parameters and the largest parameters, the time overheads are still reasonable and prove the effectiveness and efficiency of SCOPE. 
SECURITY PROPERTY
In this section, a security proof is presented. More specifically, the expression how the proposal can cope with risks of honest-but-curious attack as in Section 4.1., as well as how the proposal meets the security requirements as in Section 4.2. As introduced in Section 4.1, this attack does not aim to poison or misuse the data for any dangerous purposes, but the adversaries try to learn or infer as much personal information as possible only to satisfy their curiosity. However, this attack possibly gets more dangerous as its consequence can leave a backdoor for another attack.
Packet data security. To avoid this risk, ECC homomorphic encryption is adopted to cipher the content of the data payload of packets. The payload then gets into a secret writing, i.e., unreadable. As a result, this carries the COPE packets a shield to deteradversaries from inferring any information inside the payload. Particularly, the ECC public key used for encrypting the payload is kept by only the destination node of the packet, so the other nodes cannot read the packet anyway. Only the destination node of the packet has the private key which can be used for decrypting the payload, then the payload can be read.
Information inferring protection.
In this work, the addition property of the homomorphic encryption ECC is exploited for coding multiple packets into one packet at the intermediate node before the aggregate packet is propagated to the next hop of the intermediate node. More specifically, the public key of the destination node of the packet is used for this secret aggregation phase. The intermediate nodes just follow up with the protocol steps, and aggregates the encrypted packets without being aware of the packets' content. This point helps the data safe from the intermediate node. They cannot read the data inside and cannot infer the information as they do not have the private key of the destination node.
Coding condition evaluation security. The coding conditions involve encryptions of the node IDs as presented in Section 6.1. The comparisons are executed on these encryptions. Thus the intermediate nodes cannot learn the node IDs inside the thresholds and operands. Additionally, we also protect the neighbour nodes by encrypting their IDs, and only their direct neighbours can know their IDs, but the two-hop nodes cannot know their IDs. The comparative results are also not recognized by the nodes. Hence, the coding conditions are secured during the evaluation phase.
Performance optimization. In this work, we empower our proposal's security with the ECC encryption algorithm. The ECC encryption algorithm is invoked based on the binary field with the binary operators. This reduces much the time consumption, and meets the computing performance requirements. Additionally, the ECC is still guaranteed to be secure by NIST. So, the proposal can ensure the computing performance to be optimized.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a cryptographic approach, namely SCOPE, which is able to support nodes secretly executing the COPE protocol, by applying the lightweight homomorphic encryption ECC. Hence, the packets in SCOPE can move through the intersecting nodes without leaking any private information of the packets. Moreover, SCOPE can be also against the honestbut-curious attack at the intersecting nodes. SCOPE can keep all operations in evaluating the coding conditions or in aggregating the payload work securely. The proposal is also proved to be effective and efficient through the different experiments on a variety of ECC key sizes and different scenarios. This work will be improved to fit with more network coding protocols, such as, BEND, DCAR, etc. and to be immune to the malicious attack in the future work. 
